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The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing economic problem manifesting itself through liquidity issues in the banking system owing to foreclosures which accelerated in the United States in late 2006 and triggered a global financial crisis during 2007 and 2008. The crisis began with the bursting of the US housing bubble and high default rates on "subprime" and other adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) made to higher-risk borrowers with lower income or lesser credit history than "prime" borrowers. Loan incentives and a long-term trend of rising housing prices encouraged borrowers to assume mortgages, believing they would be able to refinance at more favorable terms later. However, once housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S., refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and foreclosure activity increased dramatically as ARM interest rates reset higher. During 2007, nearly 1.3 million U.S. housing properties were subject to foreclosure activity, up 79% from 2006. As of December 22, 2007, The Economist estimated subprime defaults would reach a level between U.S. $200–300 billion.

The mortgage lenders that retained credit risk (the risk of payment default) were the first to be affected, as borrowers became unable or unwilling to make payments. Major banks and other financial institutions around the world have reported losses of approximately U.S. $240 billion as of April 18, 2008 as cited below. Owing to a form of financial engineering called securitization, many mortgage lenders had passed the rights to the mortgage payments and related credit/default risk to third-party investors via mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Corporate, individual and institutional investors holding MBS or CDO faced significant losses, as the value of the underlying mortgage assets declined. Stock markets in many countries declined significantly.

The widespread dispersion of credit risk and the unclear effect on financial institutions caused lenders to reduce lending activity or to make loans at higher interest rates. Similarly, the ability of corporations to obtain funds through the issuance of commercial paper was affected. This aspect of the crisis is consistent with a credit crunch. The liquidity concerns drove central banks around the world to take action to provide funds to member banks to encourage the lending of funds to worthy borrowers and to re-invigorate the commercial paper markets.

The subprime crisis also places downward pressure on economic growth, because fewer or more expensive loans decrease investment by businesses and consumer spending, which drive the economy. A separate but related dynamic is the downturn in the housing market, where a surplus inventory of homes has resulted in a significant decline in new home construction and housing prices in many areas. This also places downward pressure on growth. With interest rates on a large number of subprime and other ARM due to adjust upward during the 2008 period, U.S. legislators and the U.S. Treasury Department are taking action. A systematic program to limit or defer interest rate adjustments was implemented to reduce the effect. In addition, lenders and borrowers facing defaults have been encouraged to cooperate to enable borrowers to stay in their homes. The risks to the broader economy created by the financial market crisis and housing market downturn were primary factors in several decisions by the U.S. Federal reserve to cut interest rates and the economic stimulus package signed by President George W. Bush on February 13, 2008. Both actions are designed to stimulate economic growth and inspire confidence in the financial markets.

Background information

The term subprime lending refers to the practice of making loans to borrowers who do not qualify for market interest rates due to various risk factors, such as income level, size of the down payment made, credit history, and employment status. The value of U.S. subprime mortgages was estimated at $1.3 trillion as of March 2007, with over 7.5 million first-lien subprime mortgages outstanding.Approximately 16% of subprime loans with adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were 90-days delinquent or in foreclosure proceedings as of October 2007, roughly triple the rate of 2005. By January of 2008, the delinquency rate had risen to 21% and by May 2008 it was 25%.

Subprime ARMs only represent 6.8% of the loans outstanding in the US, yet they represent 43.0% of the foreclosures started during the third quarter of 2007.A total of nearly 446,726 U.S. household properties were subject to some sort of foreclosure action from July to September 2007, including those with prime, alt-A and subprime loans. This is double the 223,000 properties in the year-ago period and 34% higher than the 333,627 in the prior quarter. This increased to 527,740 during the fourth quarter of 2007, an 18% increase versus the prior quarter. For all of 2007, nearly 1.3 million properties were subject to 2.2 million foreclosure filings, up 79% and 75% respectively versus 2006. Foreclosure filings including default notices, auction sale notices and bank repossessions can include multiple notices on the same property.

The estimated value of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) resetting at higher interest rates is U.S. $400 billion for 2007 and $500 billion for 2008. Reset activity is expected to increase to a monthly peak in March 2008 of nearly $100 billion, before declining. An average of 450,000 subprime ARM are scheduled to undergo their first rate increase each quarter in 2008.

Understanding the causes and risks of the subprime crisis

The reasons for this crisis are varied and complex. Understanding and managing the ripple effect through the world-wide economy poses a critical challenge for governments, businesses, and investors. The crisis can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the inability of homeowners to make their mortgage payments primarily due to loss of employment or health related issues; poor judgment by either the borrower and/or the lender; inappropriate mortgage incentives such as buydowns and short fixed term adjustable rate mortgages, coupled with rapidly rising adjustable mortgage rates. Further, declining home prices have made re-financing more difficult. Due to innovations in securitization, it was thought the risks related to the inability of homeowners to meet mortgage payments had been distributed broadly, with a series of consequential impacts. There are four primary categories of risk involved:

• Credit risk: Traditionally, the risk of default (called credit risk) would be assumed by the bank originating the loan. However, due to innovations in securitization, credit risk is frequently transferred to third-party investors. The rights to mortgage payments have been repackaged into a variety of complex investment vehicles, generally categorized as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO). A CDO, essentially, is a repacking of existing debt, and in recent years MBS collateral has made up a large proportion of issuance. In exchange for purchasing MBS or CDO and assuming credit risk, third-party investors receive a claim on the mortgage assets and related cash flows, which become collateral in the event of default.

• Asset price risk: MBS and CDO asset valuation is complex and related "fair value" or "mark to market" accounting is subject to wide interpretation. The valuation is derived from both the collectibility of subprime mortgage payments and the existence of a viable market into which these assets can be sold, which are interrelated. Rising mortgage delinquency rates have reduced demand for such assets. Banks and institutional investors have recognized substantial losses as they revalue their MBS downward. Several companies that borrowed money using MBS or CDO assets as collateral have faced margin calls, as lenders executed their contractual rights to get their money back. There is some debate regarding whether fair value accounting should be suspended or modified temporarily, as large write-downs of difficult to value MBS and CDO assets may have exacerbated the crisis.

• Liquidity risk: Many companies rely on access to short-term funding markets for cash to operate (i.e., liquidity), such as the commercial paper and repurchase markets. Companies and structured investment vehicles (SIV) often obtain short-term loans by issuing commercial paper, pledging mortgage assets or CDO as collateral. Investors provide cash in exchange for the commercial paper, receiving money-market interest rates. However, because of concerns regarding the value of the mortgage asset collateral linked to subprime and Alt-A loans, the ability of many companies to issue such paper has been significantly affected. The amount of commercial paper issued as of October 18, 2007 dropped by 25%, to $888 billion, from the August 8 level. In addition, the

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